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Renewed Growth and Poverty Reduction in
Zambia
Arne Bigsten and Sven Tengstam
University of Gothenburg

The Zambian economy has grown relatively fast over the last decade. This article
discusses the challenge of using these growing resources effectively to improve
the welfare of the population and reduce poverty. The poverty head count index
is found to have declined between 1998 and 2004 by about 5.4 percentage points.
This change can be decomposed into a 6.6 percentage point reduction due to
growth and a 1.2 percentage point increase due to inequality change.
Since poverty is most severe in the rural areas, it is important to make
agriculture more efficient by expanding access to electricity and improving roads,
extension services and education. The paper further highlights the need to improve
tax revenue collection and efficiency in realising budget expenditure plans. An
important reform to undertake would be to change the budget cycle. The private
sector development strategy should make the country a more attractive destination
for private investors by creating a better business environment and infrastructure.
The country needs a new trading arrangement with the European Union. Poverty
relevant social services such as health and education remain vital. The health
sector needs to be strengthened, both because it has an immediate effect on
welfare and because it helps build and protect human capital that is essential for
long-term growth. Social protection might have a role to play. It might be possible
to use schools for channelling resources to the poor. Finally, improved governance
helps all other measures to become more efficient.
1. Introduction1
The Zambian economy has been growing relatively fast over the last decade. Per
capita incomes have been increasing after a long period of stagnation or decline.
This positive trend is obviously going to be affected by the current global financial
crisis, but our analysis is restricted to the period before the crisis. During that
period, Zambia experienced strong improvements in terms of trade, but realistic
observers always expected copper prices to decline over the medium term.2 In any
event, the country faces the challenge of using resources effectively to improve the
welfare of the population and reduce poverty. We discuss public sector
effectiveness (including tax revenue collection, financial management,
transparency, accountability, education and health services), private sector
development and agriculture. We analyse empirically the incidence of growth
between 1998 and 2004 on both urban and rural households.
1
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There is need to strengthen the analysis of the poverty implications of growth
in Zambia. This is particularly pertinent since the experience from resource rich
African countries is that incomes from natural resources tend to be distributed
inequitably (Ndulu and O’Connell, 2008). It has also been hard to sustain growth
accelerations in African economies. Between 1994 and 2005 Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa (“Africa”
from here on), has grown by on average 2.1% per year,3 that is slightly higher
than during the last period of sustained African growth between 1964 and 1974.
The policy challenge for Zambia is thus to use this opportunity to generate broadbased growth with effective poverty reduction.
Zambia is in the process of implementing its Fifth National Development Plan
(FNDP) during the period 2006-2010, which is to guide policy formulation and
implementation over the period. The theme of the plan is broad-based wealth
creation through citizen participation and technological advancement. A major
weakness in previous plans has been their poor implementation due to poor
resource forecasts, weak institutional arrangements and weak monitoring. It is
hoped that new public expenditure management4 and accountability systems will
improve implementation.
In the FNDP (2006:1) it is noted that “wealth creation through sustained
economic growth constitutes the most important poverty reduction”. It is thus
acknowledged that sustained and significant poverty reduction cannot be achieved
unless the economy grows. It is also pointed out that growth and equity objectives
are not necessarily in conflict and that the government, therefore, should seek to
pursue a broad-based growth approach.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a short review of recent
economic history. We consider some aspects of the growth-equity trade-off in Section
3. Section 4 provides a review of the recent economic performance and policies.
Section 5 shows growth incidence curves for Zambia between 1998 and 2004, while
Section 6 reviews agricultural policies. Section 7 discusses the role of donors in the
policy processes and finally Section 8 summarises and concludes the article.

2. Context Setting
Zambia started out at independence as one of the richest of the newly
independent developing countries, with a per capita income that was 75% above
the African average and about four times that of East Asia. This is shown in figure
1.5 Currently, the per capita income is below the African average and about a
quarter of that in East Asia.
During the first decade of independence (1964-74), GDP per capita changed
little while it increased by 24% in Africa. Still, Zambia saw progress in social
outcomes during this period (life expectancy, child mortality, education and undernourishment) that was similar to that of other developing countries (see figures A1,
A2, A3 and A4 in the Appendix). However, from the oil crisis in 1973-1974 and up
to the mid-1990s there were severe economic problems and declines in Africa
with declining per capita incomes and tightening government budgets. This
2
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Figure 1: GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$), 1960 - 2005

Source: World Bank (2007b), authors’ own calculations

situation was compounded further by the debt crisis.6 Life expectancy in Africa
started to decline around 1985 (even before AIDS), and there were only small
reductions in child mortality and undernourishment.
Except for education, Zambia’s economic and social development during
1974-1994 was considerably worse than the African average (see figures A1, A2,
A3 and A4 in the Appendix), and even more so compared to the developing world
in general. The Zambian per capita incomes almost halved during the period. Life
expectancy started to fall already in 1977 and has declined continuously ever since.
Child mortality rose substantially during the 1980s. The magnitude of the decline
becomes clear if one looks at the undernourishment rate, which increased from
29% to 48% between 1981 and 1992. However, it has stayed more or less the
same since then. Something went terribly wrong in Zambia. Since the mid-1990s
there has been some recovery, and Zambia presently seems to grow at about the
same pace as the rest of Africa (and shows slightly improved social indicators).
Investment is the most classical growth determinant. Figure 2 shows that
investment was high until 1975 with an average of 28% of GDP. This was higher
than in East Asia at that time. But then it fell rapidly and between 1979 and 1997,
the average investment rate was as low as 14.8%. The investment rate has
gradually grown stronger since the mid-1990s and is now around 25% of GDP.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has started to increase from a low level and was
projected to reach US$480 million in 2007. That can be compared to the average
US$ 120 million per year in the early part of this decade.
3
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Figure 2: Gross capital formation (% of GDP), 1955 – 2005

Source: World Bank (2007b)

Zambia has been used in the development literature as an example of how
high aid is not in itself a guarantee for rapid growth. For example, Easterly (2002)
computed what per capita incomes in Zambia would have been had all aid gone
into investment with normal returns. He arrived at a value of US$ 20,000.7 In
reality, however, the country saw drastically falling per capita incomes, which
shows that the available resources were not effectively allocated or used. During
the last decade there have been some improvements though, which are to some
extent due to the terms of trade gains, but there have also been some
improvements in the policy environment.
Mwanawina and Mulungushi (2002) applied a growth accounting approach to
analyse the period 1960-2000. They found that capital per worker started to
decrease in 1975 and that total factor productivity (TFP) growth was slow
throughout. Moreover, when decomposing the growth shortfall in Zambia relative
to the rest of the world for the period 1960-2000, they found that capital per worker
accounted for 1.96 percentage points, education for only 0.01 percentage points,
and TFP for 0.86 percentage points.
What explains the low levels of investment and the poor TFP development?
While the 1974 oil crisis and the general slowdown in the world economy are
correlated with the negative development in Zambia, other countries were hit as
4
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hard as Zambia, so there must be more fundamental explanations. A major
political change had occurred in 1968 when Zambia started a transformation from
a free market economy with multiparty democracy into a controlled economy with
a parastatal sector created mainly through economic nationalisation. The reforms
culminated in the one party state (second republic) in 1972. “The parastatal sector
soon was confronted with political interference, inefficiency, capacity under
utilisation, lack of accountability and dependency on government subsidies”
(Mwanawina and Mulungushi, 2002: 2). It was also costly for Zambia to engage
in helping neighbouring countries in their struggle for independence. Falling
copper prices and capital flight contributed to a serious foreign exchange
constraint, which led to capacity under-utilisation. The first stabilisation and
structural adjustment programme began in 1985, but it was followed by a period
of policy reversals. Zambia started to reinstate the market economy and multiparty
democracy in 1991, although initially with mixed success. Poor sequencing of the
reforms, poor institutions and poor governance meant that the environment
remained hostile to investment.
Mwanawina and Mulungushi (2002) also undertook an econometric analysis
trying to estimate the relative contributions of different factors to Zambia’s growth
failure in 1960-97.8 Direct policies captured by the black market premium and the
size of government spending explain 1.8 % of the growth shortfall. The age
dependency ratio9 and life expectancy explain another 2.4%. Finally, being
landlocked explains 0.9%.10 It is notable that the terms of trade effect does not
have any significant effect. Finally, there was a positive residual of 0.6%. These are
underlying variables that influence investment in physical capital as well as TFP.
Overall, Zambia’s economic development during most of the Kaunda era
(1964-1991) was very poor. There is certainly no basis for any yearning for a return
to the policies of that era. The policy changes in recent years have not been
perfect, but they have at least been in the right direction.

3. The Growth-Equity Trade-off
Bigsten and Shimeles (2007) analysed the growth-redistribution trade-off for
various African countries. They found that Zambia would need to achieve an
annual increase in per capita incomes of 4.0% between 2001 and 2015 to reduce
poverty by half, assuming an unchanged income distribution (Gini-coefficient).
Bigsten and Shimeles also calculated how much the Gini-coefficient in Zambia
would have to change to halve poverty if there was no increase in per capita
incomes. They found that it would require an annual reduction of the Ginicoefficient by 2.5% or a total reduction to 0.17 by 2015. This is of course
impossible to achieve. But the calculation at least shows the shape of the tradeoff. In the case of Zambia, with the current growth largely based on a natural
resource boom, there is instead a high risk of increasing inequality unless policies
are put in place to manage the distributional consequences of the boom. The
challenge for poverty reduction is to achieve a good distributional outcome without
jeopardising long-term growth.
5
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The World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development (World Bank,
2006) deals with the role of income distribution policy in poverty reduction strategies.
It implicitly takes the view that there is not mainly a trade-off between equity and
growth, but that inequality instead in various ways is an obstacle to growth that
needs to be removed. The focus of the report is not generally on the inequality of
outcomes but rather on the inequality of opportunities. The key recommendation is
that a level playing field should be created so that opportunities are equalised.
Zambia has, for example, done this by investing in education. Although this is
desirable for reasons of fairness and efficiency there may still be tradeoffs, and we
need to understand how actual policies affect both growth and equity.
There is a risk of policy errors if the policy process focuses too much on
policies that have short-term poverty-reducing effects. The optimal development
path from a poverty reduction perspective would probably best be defined as one
that minimises the discounted sum of future poverty. A policy package that achieves
this would be different from one that minimises poverty in the short term. There are
many policies that increase consumption today at the expense of consumption
tomorrow. At the same time there are policies aimed at financing investment in
infrastructure (e.g., taxation) that generate growth and poverty reduction in the
longer term, while they may have negligible or even negative effects on the
consumption of the poor today. Redistribution from the future to the present and
from the currently non-poor to the poor can reduce poverty in the short term, but
the question that needs to be addressed is how it affects future poverty.

4. Economic Performance, Structural Change, and the Budget
After twenty five years of mostly declining real incomes, Zambia has achieved
positive per capita income growth rates in all years since the turn of the century.
Starting in 2003, these have consistently been above 2.5%. This is shown in table
1.11 This means that the Zambian economy has seen a gradual recovery.
However, the per capita income level in 2007 will still only be back to where it was
in the late 1980s. The recovery started a couple of years before the copper boom
in 2004, which has accelerated growth further. The growth objective in the FNDP
is to achieve a growth rate of at least 7% and to ensure that it is broad based and
rapid in the sectors where the poor are mostly engaged (FNDP, 2006: 26). We
also note that according to the estimates presented in the previous section,
Zambia would have needed to grow by about 6.5% per year between 2001 and
2015 to be able to reach Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1 (reduction of
poverty by half). Since the growth rate has so far been below 6.5% since 2001,
the rate of GDP growth from now until 2015 required to achieve MDG1 is about
7.7% per year (assuming an unchanged Gini-coefficient).
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Table 1: Basic macro-economic variables, 2000 – 2008
Real GDP (annual %
change)
Real per capita GDP
growth (%)12

Population growth (%)

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

1.4

2.5

0.9

2.7

2.9

2.7

3.5

3.5

3.5

2.2

2.4

2.4

2.4

2.4

2.4

2.4

2.4

2.4

-9.3

-10.7

3.6

4.9

3.3

5.1

5.4

5.2

6.2

26.0

21.4

22.2

21.4

18.0

18.3

* excl. official transfers

-19.2

-13.5

-20.8

-13.9

-17.3

-9.2

-15.9

100

112.0

110.9

101.7

107.8

134.7

176.4

-4.2

-1.7

-6.7

4.4

21.4

5.5

18.3

-9.7

-7.0

234

297

330

353

393

423

476

555

610

10.7

10.9

* incl. official transfers

Real effective exchange
rate (2000=100)
Terms of Trade
(% Change)

Copper export volume
(000’ tons)
Population, million

-5.5

10.5

-9.6

-3.8

-7.9

11.1

-3.8

11.3

-9.0

11.5

-5.1

8.0

6.5

Inflation (%)

Current account balance (% of GDP)

9.1

6.2

-9.7

-5.9

GDP (Kwacha, trillions)

10.07

13.13 16.26
19.1

17.9

20.48

25.92

32.45

39.30

44.14

48.29

Gov. exp. (excl. interest)
% of GDP

27.9

29.7

27.2

27.1

23.2

23.1

21.5

22.1

22.5

-7.0

-8.1

-6.3

-6.6

-1.7

-2.6

13.5

-2.1

-2.0

Gov. rev. (excl. grants),
% of GDP
Gov. overall balance,
cash basis

19.4

18.0

18.2

17.4

16.8

17.5

17.9

Note. 2005 is preliminary and 2006-2008 are projections

Source: IMF (2007b) Real effective exchange rate. World Bank (2007b) and IMF (2007b)
consumer prices. IMF (2007b) and own calculations of real per capita GDP growth. IMF (2006a)
population growth 2001-2008. IMF (2007b) population growth 2000. IMF (2007a) Average period
exchange rate. None of these figures are prognoses, preliminaries or projections. Real GDP
(annual % change) and population growth are projections for 2005-2008. The GDP deflator is
preliminary for 2005 and projected for 2006-2008. Bank of Zambia (2007) Exchange rates for
2006 and 2007 Jan-March. World Bank (2007b) for population. IMF (2006a, 2006b)) for the rest.

The growth improvement involves most sectors with mining and quarrying,
manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, and real estate and
business services as driving sectors. Agricultural output has at least expanded
reasonably well since the 1990s.13 Historically the share of mining and quarrying
has fallen dramatically, but during the last few years it has grown fast. Copper has
historically dominated exports. Copper production exceeded 400,000 tonnes
annually in the late 1950s. It reached a peak of 700,000 tonnes between 1969
and 1976 before beginning a progressive decline. In 2000, it was as low as
7
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257,000 tonnes (Republic of Zambia, 2007, and DFID, 2006). The copper price fell
in real terms until the early 2000s when it was one-third of the 1960-80 price. It has
increased dramatically in the last few years and is now about the same as at the
1967 peak level. This is shown in figure 3.
Figure 3: Copper prices per tonne (constant 2000 US$), 1960 – 2006

Source: IMF (2007a)

The exported quantity of copper has doubled during the last five years, which
in combination with dramatic price hikes means that export revenues from copper
have increased rapidly. However, non-traditional exports have also increased
substantially in recent years, with copper wire and electrical cables having the
biggest volumes and sugar and tobacco doing well. While the current account
balance, including grants is negative, the overall balance has been positive during
the last few years due to substantial inflows of private net capital.
Total exports in dollar value have increased fourfold since 2000. They reached
US$ 3.3 billion in 2006. This equals approximately US$ 250 (constant 2000) per
capita which is back at the per capita level of the early 1980s but still just half of
the average 1960-80 levels.
During 1995-2003 the Kwacha depreciated not only against the United States
dollar but also against a basket of currencies, although the real exchange rate
was quite stable. However, from January 2004 to January 2007 the Kwacha
appreciated relative to the US dollar from K4,767 to K4,221 per US$ (it peaked in
May 2006 at K3,185). The exchange rate peaked because of a combination of
rocketing copper prices, restrictive money supply by the Bank of Zambia to get
inflation down, radical debt reduction, and portfolio inflows.14
Generally, when faced with an appreciating exchange rate the government
8
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needs to think of ways to pursue policies that benefit the survival of the tradables
sector. An example of this could be to use the new revenue to reduce exporter
costs, such as investment in transport and energy. The impact of the resource
rents on the real exchange rate can also be contained by increasing imports,
where the major tool is, of course, trade liberalisation. Policy changes like these,
of course, have distributional consequences that need to be considered.
Although real GDP increased by 34% between 2000 and 2006, government
revenue collection (excluding grants) went up by only 16%. This means that
revenues as a percentage of GDP slipped from 19.4% in 2000 to 16.8% in 2006.
This is to some extent explained by the Kwacha appreciation resulting in a lower
Kwacha value of the Value Added Tax (VAT) on imports and customs duty (0.7%
of GDP). But bringing especially the agricultural sector and the informal sector
into the tax net is a problem. Furthermore, the whole fiscal regime for minerals is
too generous to the existing mining houses. The planned increase in royalties will
give the Treasury some extra funds, but what is required is a combination of
measures such as increased royalties, increased corporate income tax and
withholding tax on dividends. The new fiscal regime still does not include a form
of windfall tax, which would allow Zambia to get a fair share of the current windfall
revenues. We have also seen a piecemeal approach to tax policy in the past, and
it is important to expedite a comprehensive review of the tax system (IMF, 2006b).
At the same time, government expenditure as a percentage of GDP has
been falling. It is about the same in real terms now as at the beginning of the
decade. The overall budget deficit has been kept around 2% of GDP since 2004.
Budget discipline is, of course, a positive factor, but expenditures have mainly
been kept low due to failures to carry out the budget plans. A key concern with
regard to Zambian governance is budget implementation, and in particular its
consequences for the poverty reduction strategy. There has been some progress
with regard to domestic resource mobilisation through the Zambia Revenue
Authority (ZRA), and at the same time Zambia receives increasing amounts of
budget support. However, much work remains to be done to extend the tax
coverage and even more so with regard to the implementation of the existing tax
legislation.
It is important to achieve a budget allocation that is relevant for poverty
reduction and that strikes a sensible balance between short-term and long-term
effects on poverty. In the FNDP there is an increased emphasis on growth issues
that are good for poverty reduction in the longer term, but it is also important that
the programmes which can have a more immediate impact are functioning well.
There seem to be high levels of inefficiency in the ways the government works,
and considerable budget resources have not been spent in recent years. In 2006,
K8,665 billion was spent out of the K9,942 billion in the approved budget. The
K757 billion difference is explained by shortfalls in total revenues and grants
relative to the targets. However, another K521 billion was unspent and only 5% of
the approved budget for capital expenditures were used. In 2004 and 2005 the
amounts not spent were even higher (Republic of Zambia, 2006b).
9
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In this context one might note that the country has an absurdly misaligned
budget cycle. The budget decision is taken in Parliament in March, while the
budget year starts in January. This means that many activities are put on hold –
something that surely makes it harder to meet expenditure and activity targets.
However, addressing this problem requires a constitutional amendment which
seems to be buried in the slow process to revise the full constitution15.
Since we are here concerned with poverty reduction, we need to consider the
implication of the fact that the economic expansion is driven by the copper sector.
This means that there is relatively limited expansion of formal sector employment,
which in turn means that the informal sector has to continue to absorb the bulk of
the labour that keeps leaving agriculture. This implies that most of the new migrants
will probably earn very low incomes. The Central Statistical Office (CSO) (2005)
reports that there were approximately 6.7 million persons aged 12 and above in
2004. Fifty-nine percent of these were employed and 6% were unemployed. Hence
65% of this age group constitutes the labour force. Almost all of those outside the
labour force are reported as full-time students or full-time homemakers. Eighty-one
percent of the employed persons were engaged in the informal sector16, up from
79% in 1998. In rural areas this proportion was unchanged at 91%, but the
proportion in the urban areas increased from 48% to 57%. The increase in informal
employment could partly be explained by the fact that 5% of the population aged
12 and above reported themselves as unpaid family workers in 2004, while less
than 1% did so in 1998. Consequently, a new group has been added to the
employed. However, the fact that the total number of persons employed in the
formal sector has gone up from 740,000 to only 780,000 over the same period
shows that the formal sector is not keeping up with population growth.
Another serious problem with regard to poverty reduction is that the
government does not collect much tax revenue (directly) from the copper sector
(obviously the government is not able to collect significant revenues from the
informal sector either), because the firms that bought the copper companies at
the bottom of the crisis at the turn of the century were given extremely favourable
terms with extensive tax exemptions. The government is now trying to renegotiate
the copper contracts, and hopefully something beneficial will come out of this.
Although the government certainly could do more with a larger budget, it is still
very important to improve efficiency in terms of how the existing money is handled
and spent. The process of reforming public financial management has been
ongoing for a long time, but progress seems to be exceedingly slow. Zambia is
introducing an integrated financial management information system (IFMIS) within
the public expenditure management and financial accountability (PEMFA)
programme to strengthen the financial management system. To get a modern
system in place to track expenditures is a central dimension in the reform process.
There is not yet a single treasury account, and the cash management still seems
to be inefficient.
The government has difficulties both implementing performance assessment
indicators and terminating inefficient programmes. Decentralisation efforts are
10
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ongoing, although this seems to be a challenging task. The Auditor General
supplies reports with critical information to the Public Accounts Committee of the
National Assembly, but the actions are decided by the Executive. Still, this is done
in camera and people are becoming more aware. Large-scale corruption is being
tackled, but small scale corruption does not seem to be declining. The Corruption
Perception Index (Transparency International, 2008) has not changed at all since
the turn of the century.

5. Poverty and Inequality Outcomes
Zambia is unusually urbanised for an African country, with an urban population
share of 39%. Yet, the country does not have an unusually large share of the
labour force in formal sector employment (19% of the employed or 17% of the
labour force). The bulk (66%) of the urban labour force is in the informal sector or
unemployed (CSO, 2005). This needs to be taken into account when formulating
poverty reduction policies. Still, there has certainly not been any overemphasis on
the poor rural inhabitants and reaching those groups will remain the key challenge.
The country has conducted at least six countrywide surveys since 1991 to
measure the living standards of its people (CSO, 2005). The 2002/03 Living
Conditions Monitoring Survey III (LCMS III) was an Integrated Household Budget
survey; a diary method was used and a 12-month period was covered. The other
five were Indicator Monitoring Surveys; one-spot (single interview) surveys. It is
therefore not completely appropriate to compare the results from LCMS III with the
results from the other surveys. The poverty lines in the Indicator Monitoring
Surveys (see table AI in the Appendix) were originally derived from a 1981
ILO/JASPA basic needs mission to Zambia. The Zambian poverty lines have been
based on the Food-Energy Intake approach. In 1991 the cost of the food basket
(the poverty line) was updated.17 The poverty lines were then again updated in
subsequent surveys by the change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
(Situmbeko, n.d.) In all of them the calorie requirements per adult equivalent was
set at 2,721; not at 2,450 as recommended by the World Health Organisation
(WHO) (CSO, 2004): this, of course, means that the estimated level of poverty is
higher than if the WHO recommendation had been used.
The surveys collected data on household consumption expenditures. Two
poverty lines are used by the CSO: the extreme poverty line is the food poverty line,
which was K78, 223 (1.02 PPP adjusted international 2000 US$/day) in 2004. The
moderate poverty line also includes consumption of “some minimum basic non-food
items such as health, shelter and education”. This part is assumed to make up 30%
of the consumption bundle of the poor. Thus, the moderate poverty line can simply
be constructed as 1/(1-0.3) times the food poverty line, or K111,747 (1.45 PPP
adjusted international 2000US$/day). This can be compared with the World Bank
poverty line of 1.22 PPP adjusted international 2000 $/day (World Bank, 2007b).
The World Bank has 28% non-food items in the basket defining the poverty line.
The levels of poverty recorded for Zambia by the CSO are significantly higher
than those of other African countries at a similar income level. The World Bank
11
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(2007a) argues in their analysis of poverty in 2002/03 that the poverty line used
by the CSO is too high. While CSO’s moderate poverty line for 2002/03 was
estimated to be K92,185, the World Bank estimated it to be K73, 394. Their
respective estimates of the incidence of poverty were 67% and 56%.
The methodologies used by the World Bank and the CSO to estimate the
level of poverty for 2002/03 are similar, but the assumptions underlying the
estimations differ in several respects. The first difference between the two poverty
line estimates is that CSO sets the calorie requirement per adult equivalent at
2,721, while the World Bank uses the WHO (1985) recommendation of 2,464
calories. Secondly, there is a difference in how the consumption basket of the poor
is constructed. CSO uses Lusaka prices from the first of the ten cycles in the
survey as reference prices, while the World Bank uses national median prices. To
determine the food basket underlying the poverty line, CSO calculates quantities
by dividing national average expenditure shares by Lusaka cycle one prices. This
means that the CSO basket has less of foods that are expensive in Lusaka relative
to the national representative food basket. Then both institutions compute district
poverty lines using district prices relative to the baseline prices. There are,
furthermore, some small differences between the two estimates in how the price
index is constructed. The discussion of the CSO and the World Bank is of some
importance with regard to the poverty discussion within Zambia, but it is mainly
with regard to international comparisons that it is important to keep measurements
consistent across countries. The CSO-estimated poverty line seems quite high.
The World Bank estimate gives a more internationally comparable estimate of the
level of poverty in Zambia. However, with regard to changes over time, the level
of the poverty line matters less. Here, it is important that the procedures to
compute the poverty line do not change over time. We will stick to the CSO line
in our estimates below for 1998-2004, although we do find that the World Bank line
is preferable for some uses.
The 1998 food poverty line was K32,861 per adult equivalent. The CPI
adjusted poverty lines from 1993, 1996 and 1998 are updated versions of the
1991 line using CPI (CSO, 2005:112). However, it seems that the 2004 poverty
line was not updated accordingly. It was instead updated with the CPI based on
the 2002/03 line, which was calculated from scratch. The increase of the poverty
line between 1998 and 2004 is smaller than the CPI increase, suggesting that the
2002/03 computations probably were done based on food prices (which makes
sense given the way the poverty line is constructed).
The CSO-estimated poverty levels are shown in Table 2. According to
these, national poverty was virtually the same in 2004 as in 1991. The rural level
of poverty declined from 88% to 78%, while the urban poverty level increased
from 49% to 53%. However, both urban and rural poverty declined from 1998 to
2004.18
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Table 2: Historical development of moderate poverty levels, 1991 -2004
Poverty level

Rural poverty level

Urban poverty level

Source: CSO (2005)

1991

199319

1996

1998

2004

88

92

82

83

78

70

74

49

45

69

73

46

56

68
53

The poverty levels in 1998 and 2004 are estimated using the standard FGT
index, which is given as:

Where n is the total number of households, q is the number of households
below the poverty line, z is the poverty line and yi is the consumption of household
i. For α = 0, the FGT index reduces to the head-count ratio H; for α = 1, it is the
poverty-gap or depth of poverty; and for α = 2 the FGT index has been interpreted
as indicating the severity of poverty.
Table 3: FGT-indices of moderate poverty for total, rural and urban households
1998

Total

2004

1998

Rural

2004

Urban
1998
2004

Head count

72.93

67.56

83.45

77.47

55.05

52.12

Severity

26.71

22.73

34.82

29.86

13.20

11.98

Depth

40.05

Source: Own calculations

35.22

49.94

44.10

23.74

22.00

We see in table 3 that poverty is much more widespread and severe in rural
areas. The positive news is that the rural depth of poverty fell from 0.72 in 1991
to 0.50 in 1998, and then finally to 0.44 in 2004.
Next we take a closer look at how the poverty changes have been brought
about, using the approach of Datt and Ravallion (1992). They devised a simple
decomposition algorithm able to decompose the change in poverty between two
points in time into one part due to per capita income change and one part due to
inequality change plus a residual. We apply this approach on the change in
poverty from 1998 to 2004. The basic formula is:
P 04 - P 98 = G(98,04) + D(98,04) + R(98,04)
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The growth component G and the redistribution component D are given by
G(98,04) = P(z 04 /µ04 04 ,L 98 ) - P(z 98 /µ 98 ,L 98 )

D(98,04) = P(z 98 /µ 98 ,L 04 ) - P(z 98 /µ 98 ,L 98 ),

Where, for example, P(z 04 /µ04 04 ,L 98 ) is the poverty level that Zambia would
have had in 2004 with a 1998 income distribution and a 2004 per capita income
level. Since the poverty measures used are not additively separable, we get a
residual component R.
We have used this method to decompose the change in moderate poverty
from 1998 to 2004. This decomposition is based on the official poverty lines, even
though we have some concerns about them as discussed above. Our
consumption expenditure per adult equivalent based Gini-coefficients are 0.533 for
1998 and 0.544 for 2004, indicating that there was a slight increase in the Ginicoefficient over this period.20 Tables 4, 5 and 6 report our results.
Table 4: Decomposition of changes in total moderate poverty

Period

Head count (P0)

Growth Redistribution Residual Total change
component Component In poverty

1998 to 2004

-6.62

1.24

0.01

-5.37

1998 to 2004

-5.41

0.68

-0.10

-4.83

1998 to 2004

-4.27

0.39

-0.10

-3.98

Depth (P1)

Severity P(2)

Source: Own calculations

The results for changes in moderate poverty show that growth contributed
significantly to poverty reduction in the period 1998-2004, both in urban and rural
areas. Although there was a modest poverty increasing effect from the inequality
increase, overall poverty still declined substantially.
Since Zambia is a very unequal society with a Gini-coefficient almost as high
as that of South Africa, there is an underutilised poverty reduction potential from
policies aimed at decreasing inequality. We see that the negative effect of income
distribution change on poverty is somewhat more pronounced in urban areas than
in rural areas. We repeated the same calculations for extreme poverty for the
period 1998-2004, and found the same pattern there.
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Table 5: Decomposition of changes in rural moderate poverty
Period

Growth
component

Redistribution
Component

Residual

Total change
In poverty

1998 - 2004

-6.53

0.21

0.34

-5.98

1998 - 2004

-7

1

0.16

-5.84

1998 - 2004

-6.06

1.1

0

-4.96

Head count (P0)

Depth (P1)

Severity P(2)

Source: Own calculations

Table 6: Decomposition of changes in urban moderate poverty
Period

Growth
component

Redistribution
component

Residual

Total change
In poverty

1998 - 2004

-5.9

2.85

0.12

-2.93

1998 - 2004

-3.45

1.84

-0.13

-1.74

1998 - 2004

-2.28

1.2

-0.14

-1.22

Head count (P0)

Depth (P1)

Severity P(2)

Source: Own calculations

Poverty is clearly more severe in rural areas, but we also note that income
growth has been somewhat better there than in urban areas. The incidence as
measured by the head count is, of course, much higher, but the urban-rural
differences are even larger when comparing the depth and the severity of poverty.
The results are in line with indicators such as life expectancy, undernutrition and
child mortality, where Zambia has been scoring worse than Africa in general since
around 1990 (see figures A1, A2 and A4 in the Appendix). Hence, even if poverty
is being urbanised in Africa, it is still overwhelmingly rural.
To characterise the growth pattern further we have constructed growth
incidence curves for all of Zambia, rural and urban Zambia. These curves show
how consumption growth varies across deciles of the population, and how average
real household consumption increased from 1998 to 2004. The curves are deflated
by the poverty line.
For all of Zambia, we can see that all deciles experienced positive growth
during the period. This is shown in figure 4. There is no clear pattern of differences
across income levels.
The results for rural Zambia shown in figure 5 indicate that the bottom decile
has done really well, but one needs to be cautious not to read into this too much,
since measuring there is problematic. These are households with very low
15
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Figure 4: All of Zambia growth incidence curve

Source: Own calculations

Figure 5: Rural growth incidence curve

Source: Own calculations
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incomes. Apart from the bottom decile, the curve slopes generally upward,
indicating that the better-off farmers on the whole did somewhat better than their
poorer colleagues.
When it comes to the urban growth incidence curve shown in figure 6, we
see that the bottom of the distribution has done slightly better than the intermediate
range, while the richest urban decile in particular was successful. It is perhaps
not surprising that the better off in particular benefit when there is acceleration in
the growth of the economy.
Figure 6: Urban growth incidence curve

Source: Own calculations

6. Agricultural policies
In the 1980s, up to 17% of the national budget was devoted to maize and fertiliser
subsidies, but these were then scaled back. However, in recent years as much as
70% of the Ministry of Agriculture budget has gone to fertiliser subsidies and maize
marketing and stockholding programmes. Only 20% of small farmers use fertilisers
in Zambia. The farmers’ effective demand for fertilisers must be built up by making
it profitable to use, which includes developing output markets and regional trade
patterns. Jayne et al. (2007) argue that “sustained investment in crop science,
effective extension programmes, physical infrastructure and a stable and
supportive policy environment” is where public sector resources can make the
best use. Targeted assistance to vulnerable households is important but should
not interfere with the long-term development of agricultural markets.
Since the bulk of the poor in Zambia are found in rural areas, it is of course
17
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vitally important to develop agriculture and other rural economic activities.
Development of agriculture is also important to bring about the structural change
required for long-term growth. The introduction of a complex set of subsidy
programmes via local governments and cooperatives does not seem to be the
most efficient route to improve rural incomes. This has meant that the private
network sellers of fertilisers are in trouble and many do not even hold fertiliser
stocks any more since their market has been taken away. Local traders and
network sellers need a predictable environment to get incentives for a long-term
engagement in the sector. The recent huge government maize purchase is a
signal pointing in the wrong direction. The private traders who had entered the
business are squeezed.
The Food Reserve Agency (FRA) should be just that and not a last resort
buyer. The policy in this area was rather straightforward until the last election when
the purchases of the FRA shot up from 50,000 to 400,000 tonnes. The surplus
was supposed to be exported but that has still not happened. Instead there seems
to be a high risk that much of it will be wasted. The government seems to have had
a roadmap for private sector growth in agriculture, but now there seems to be a
move of policy thinking towards more state intervention and subsidy schemes.
Subsidised fertilisers are sold through farmer unions and the like, and the wellconnected people end up getting access. There are suggestions that there are
very extensive rent-seeking activities going on, where the elite get the cheap
fertiliser and then re-sell it.
Hence, the introduction of these subsidy schemes is problematic not only from
an efficiency perspective but also from a distributional point of view. Since 75% of
farmers do not sell maize at all and a small minority, 2%, sells half of it, the
distributional impact of these subsidies is skewed. The subsidy scheme has also had
other distortionary effects. Since the guaranteed prices are higher than in
neighbouring countries, it seems obvious that maize is carried over the border and
sold into the Zambian reserves. There are at least four places along the borders
where the buying stations have bought much more than the local farmers sold (socalled ghost sales).
There is a high variation within districts in terms of land ownership and land
ownership is a key income determining factor. The issue of land ownership has not
yet been sorted out. In areas under traditional tenure (94% of the land), the chief
decides on the allocation of land. Everyone is supposed to have land according
to capability, but this is, of course, a flexible concept. Influence seems to matter a
lot as well. Local allocation of land in fairer ways seems highly important. Insecurity
of tenure may have significant effects on the willingness of farmers to invest and
on their ability to use land as collateral for loans to finance investment.
Bigsten and Tengstam (2009) show that smallholders in Zambia are
dependent on a whole range of off-farm incomes, and that it is, therefore,
important not to look at rural policies as only those that concern agriculture. Paving
the way for diversification is also key in a package of poverty-reduction policies.
Infrastructure that facilitates activities other than agriculture includes many things
18
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that are also beneficial for agriculture, e.g. a good transport infrastructure. The
diversification route to higher incomes for rural households requires a wellfunctioning economic environment and general policies that make it possible for
new activities to emerge.

7. Donors and Governance
We have argued in this article that the formulation of policies and probably even
more the implementation of those policies is a key challenge for Zambian
development. We conclude with a brief discussion of what this implies for donors.
Donors have developed a Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ), which
is related to the FNDP. This is to provide an analysis and a basis for collaboration.
JASZ has a lead donor concept, which is almost fully implemented. Also, the
coordination of donors is a complicated process. The Zambian aid policy is now
approved. The Aid Department at the Ministry of Finance and National Planning is
working more or less as it did twenty years ago, but is currently revising its structure
to allow for the donor coordination efforts. The FNDP is generally sensible in terms
of overall policy direction, but the challenge is to implement the policies especially
since governance in Zambia remains weak. This is or should be the key concern
from a donor point of view with regard to development cooperation with Zambia.
Collier (2006) discusses aid collaboration in Africa and notes that the resourcerich countries often have had large and corrupt government sectors, since they have
been able to earn sizeable resource rents which accrue to the government. Although
the resource rents accruing to the Zambian government today are very much
reduced compared to the initial decades after independence, the current system
nevertheless emerged under those circumstances. Collier argues that the
appropriate strategy towards countries in this category is to find ways to improve
their efficiency in spending public money. This can be done through knowledge
transfers and governance conditionality trying to make the government more
accountable to its citizens. For rents (and aid money which also can be seen as a
sort of rent) to be effectively used, it is probably necessary that power is more widely
diffused. The development of good systems of public spending can be supported by
appropriate technical assistance. There is a strong need for proper project
evaluation techniques to be incorporated in the project evaluation and monitoring
(PEM) systems in Zambia. Transparency and accountability mechanisms are
certainly important, but one must not forget that bad policies will have poor impacts
and results even if they are implemented transparently and with full accountability.
Policy conditionality was not very successful in dealing with the problems of
elite capture. The alternative of governance conditionality aimed at weakening the
dominance of the governing elite was proposed by Collier (2006) as a better
alternative.21 Unfortunately there is a knowledge gap about how to implement
governance conditionality. A parallel constraint is the lack of administrative
capacity in the civil service, which needs to be developed by various forms of
technical assistance. Technical assistance needs to be aligned with the new
paradigm of ownership and control.
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Democracy has two dimensions: electoral competition and checks and
balances. Resource rich countries in particular need democracy to avoid elite capture
of rents. They also need checks and balances to prevent elections from being
converted into corrupt patronage games financed by the resource rents. One needs
system scrutiny to achieve honesty and other systems to achieve efficiency. Since
scrutiny is a public good it is subject to collective action problems, and donors could
possibly take a role to stimulate peer group evaluations. The donors could help
improve the information to the principals (citizens) and build up their capacity to
analyse it, and help promote incentives for government agents to act in accordance
with the wishes of the principals. Audit systems and parliamentary scrutiny are key
areas of intervention, and these are both part of the PEMFA programme.
A key aim of donors in Zambia should be to improve governance and
implementation capacity. This may require governance conditionality combined
with technical assistance to build up systems that can handle government
resources in a transparent and accountable manner. Zambia has reformed
economic policies extensively and the current FNDP seems reasonable. How well
the government will succeed in achieving growth and poverty reduction will
depend on the amount of resources it can mobilise, but it is also crucially important
that the government is able to implement policies effectively.

8. Concluding Remarks
This article started with a discussion of Zambia’s economic development up to
the present phase which is characterised by a resource boom. We discussed
current economic policies, and provided our own empirical estimates of changes
in poverty, mainly from 1998 to 2004. Against this background we considered the
appropriateness of economic policies for poverty reduction. The focus has not
been on the macroeconomic issues which have been dealt with extensively by
others, but instead on micro and structural issues.
We found that poverty as measured by the head count index declined by
about 5.4 percentage points. We decomposed this change into a 6.6 percentage
point reduction due to growth and a 1.2 percentage point increase due to a slight
change in inequality. We also looked at the growth incidence across consumption
deciles. According to our estimates all deciles experienced an increase in
consumption between the two years. Overall the increase seems to have been
somewhat larger in rural areas, with the exception of the top urban decile which
experienced a rapid consumption increase. Poverty still remains much more
severe in the rural areas than in the urban areas. We also note that poverty leads
to undernutrition, that life expectancy in Zambia is among the lowest in the world,
and that under-5 child mortality is very high.
We saw in our analysis of the pattern of smallholder income growth that
diversification is a very important route out of poverty for the rural poor in Zambia.
Policy makers should thus keep in mind that rural household incomes are not from
agriculture alone. A major focus should be on measures that strive to facilitate the
diversification process. Typically, these are policies that develop the overall economic
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environment and help smallholders get better market access. Agriculture is a major
part of the private sector in Zambia, and should receive higher priority in policy.
The government often has sensible private sector development policies, but
according to several observers they are implemented poorly, slowly and
reluctantly. This is the classical Zambian problem of a disjoint between sensible
policy analyses and the capacity and willingness to implement the policies. Policy
is often inconsistent as to what to do with the private sector. It seems as if the
government likes interventions to be specific rather than general. The reluctance
to move away from ad hoc government interventions may in part be due to the
lingering Kaunda romanticism.
So what are our policy conclusions? First, we saw from the review that tax
revenue collection has not kept pace with GDP growth, one reason being that the
copper boom generates little direct tax revenue. Another reason is that most
employment is within the informal sector, where hardly any tax is collected. Still,
the poor tax buoyancy is a concern from a poverty reduction perspective, because
collecting tax revenues and using them for poverty reducing expenditures would
have been one of the main ways to channel resources from the boom to the poor.
Second, we noted that the government is very inefficient in realising its
expenditure plans. This is a reflection of the generally low level of efficiency in the
public sector, and it is absolutely essential that the financial management reforms
are speeded up. Smooth and transparent reporting is key for domestic
accountability and also for development cooperation. An important reform to
undertake would be to change the budget cycle. It certainly seems absurd to decide
on the budget in the Parliament in March when the budget year starts in January!
Third, we noted that improved public sector efficiency is crucial if reforms are
to function properly. We discussed various issues relating to transparency and
accountability, and the importance of monitoring by the electorate, the donors and
by government institutions such as the Auditor General.
Fourth, it is clear that the focus of poverty oriented policies will largely have to
be on the rural sector and agriculture, since rural poverty is much more extensive
than urban poverty. Since Zambia is a very unequal society with a high Ginicoefficient, poverty levels could also be reduced via a lowering of inequality. But
since the average income and consumption is extremely low, growth is crucial for
poverty reduction. To make agriculture more efficient and to reduce rural poverty,
resources should be used in line with the FNDP to improve infrastructure such as
roads and electricity supply, extension services and education rather than for
subsidy schemes. More than half of the Ministry of Agriculture budget has gone to
fertiliser subsidies (mostly for maize) and maize programmes. However, there has
been diversification and in recent years it is, for example, cassava, sweet potatoes
and livestock production that have performed well. Secure property rights are of
course also a crucial determinant of rural investment. While the FNDP emphasises
the measures just mentioned, implementation in these areas seems to be slow.
Fifth, there are some good intentions in the private sector development
strategy, but implementation again seems to be inefficient. The government still
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seems to focus too much on the need to control and intervene in details, while it
would be more efficient to do away with excessive interventions. If Zambia is to be
able to reach an economic take-off, the country must be an attractive destination
for both foreign and domestic private investors. Apart from a better business
environment, the infrastructure must be improved (particularly since Zambia is
landlocked), and the country needs a successful completion of a new trading
arrangement with the European Union.
Sixth, even if there is a need for policies towards the productive sectors, the
very important areas of poverty relevant social services such as health and
education remain vital. The health sector needs to be strengthened both because
it has an immediate effect on welfare and because it helps build and protect
human capital that is essential for long-term growth.22
Seventh, social protection might have a role to play, but it is probably not
possible to expand this fast. It might be possible to use schools for channelling
resources to the poor. By having, for example, free school lunches and school
uniforms, a certain amount of “child support” would be provided and school
attendance would be encouraged at the same time. There are some interesting
but small-scale experiments of social protection done with donor support. For
example, the Ministry of Community Development is currently experimenting with
a cash transfer scheme in the Southern Province that seems to hold some
promise.23 There is, of course, a concern as to the ability of the system to scale
up this, and the cost implications of that have not yet been analysed.
Eighth, we have repeatedly noted that improved governance is the key to
successful development, an idea that has been floated is that donors should shift
to some form of governance conditionality. This would mean a concentration on
achieving a transparent and accountable process rather than on achieving specific
decisions.

Appendix: Tables and Figures

Table A1: Poverty lines, 1981-2004.

Year of Survey (ending month)
1981 ILO/JASP

1991 PSI (nov)

1993 PSII (june)

1996 LCMSI (sept)
1998 LCMSII (dec)

2002/3 LCMSIII (oct)

2004 LCMSIV (jan 05)

Source: CSO (2005)
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Poverty lines

Food Poverty
K60

K961

K5,910

K20,181

K32,861

K64,530
K78,223

Moderately
K105.94
K1,380

K8,480

K28,979

K47,187

K92,185

K111,747
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Figure A1: Life expectancy at birth, total (years)

Source: World Bank (2007b), authors’ own calculations.

Figure A2: Mortality rate under-5 (per 1000)

Note: The 1965 and 1975 values for SSA and South Asia and Pacific are authors’’
estimations, due to lack of data. Sub Saharan Africa (incl. South Africa) is used due to lack
of data.
Source: World Bank (2007b)
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Figure A3: Average years of schooling

Note: Since no data is available for SSA, South Asia or East Asia; average of Ghana,
Kenya, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and DRC is used for SSA, India
is used for South Asia and Malaysia is used for East Asia. They are fairly representative for
respectively country-group (please note that data for China is not available).
Source: Barro and Lee (2000).

Figure A4: Prevalence of undernourishment (%)

Source: World Bank (2007b), authors’ own calculations
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Commodity prices are generally volatile and unpredictable. The typical pattern has been a
rapid price increase when there is a stockout of the commodity (when stocks fall below some
level that is considered acceptable) (Collier, 2007). This abrupt increase in the price of a
commodity is then generally followed by a slow long-term decline. The pattern one observes
is consequently one with short periods of very high prices with slowly falling prices in
between. Zambia currently has extremely high copper prices, but experience from other such
periods thus seems to suggest that it will be followed by a long period of declining prices.
Countries have generally found it difficult to handle commodity booms (Collier and Gunning,
1999; O’Connell and Ndulu, 2006), and Zambia has previously had problems handling
resource incomes in an effective manner (Bigsten, 2001).
1994-2005 World Bank (2007b), 2005-2007 IMF (2007b), 2006-2007 is an estimate.

For example, the Integrated Financial Management Information System and expenditure
programme controls making sure that no investments that do not have a certain minimum
internal rate of return are undertaken.

The initial differences are somewhat smaller in PPP adjusted constant 2000 international $:
Zambia 1390, Africa 990, South Asia 1010 and East Asia and Pacific 530 (authors’ own
calculations and World Bank, 2007b).

In the early 1980s the international community throttled the inflow of loan money to less than
debt service levels (net flows became negative). This contributed to cutbacks in government
expenditures and lower investments both in the social sectors and in infrastructure.

“I start with a comparison of what Zambia’s actual average income is to what it would have
been, $2 billion of aid later, if filling the financing gap has worked as predicted ( ). Zambia
today would be an industrialised country with a per capita income of $20,000, instead of its
actual condition as one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income of $600
(which is one third lower than at independence). Zambia is one of the worst cases for the
financing gap approach, because it already had a high investment rate before aid and it got
a lot of aid. But Zambia’s investment rate went down, not up, as the aid increased, and the
investment in a case did not yield growth” (Easterly, 2002: 42).

The black market premium was around 100 %, which lowered the annual growth by 0.7 %.
Had the size of the government sector been 20 % instead of around 30 % of GDP, growth
would have been 1.1 % higher. Being landlocked lowered growth by 0.9 %. The age
dependency ratio has been around 100 %, but if this had been 70 % as in e.g. India in the
1980s, growth would have been 1.5 % higher. Had life expectancy been 60 years instead of
50, then growth would have been 0.9 % higher.

Controlled for difference between growth of working age population and total population.

10 Geography is important (Sachs and Warner, 1997, and Bloom and Sachs, 1998) as it could
either undermine the health of workers or impose high transactions costs.
11 IMF (2006b) estimates the annual population growth to 2.4 %, but World Bank (2007b)
reports an average rate of 1.9 % for the period.

12 The total gross value of agricultural output rose by over 50% between the mid-90s and 20012004 (Jayne et. al., 2007), and grew annually by 3.8 % 2003-2006 (Republic of Zambia,
2006a and 2006b).
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13 A debt management system is under way with the help of the IMF and the World Bank. Maybe
large new loans will have to pass through Parliament. The country is more creditworthy again,
but for the time being the government is not in any shape to start taking large new loans.

14 Informal sector employment is defined as employment where the employed persons are not
entitled to paid leave, pension, gratuity and social security, and work in an establishment
employing five persons or less.
15 The budget cycle was changed in the 2010 budget.

16 By the National Food and Nutrition Commission, and the Price and Incomes Commission.

17 Poverty levels generally change with the seasons. The 1993 survey was conducted AprilJune, which is a season when the poverty level is approximately three percentage points
lower than the yearly average. The other four surveys (except 2002/03) were conducted
when poverty levels were in general 3-5 percentage points higher than the yearly average
(World Bank, 2007a:54).

18 The Gini-coefficient for income is estimated by CSO to be 0.57 (Zambia, 2006c: 16). Our
estimate of the Gini-coefficient for the distribution of per adult equivalent consumption is
slightly lower at 0.544. Consumption distributions tend to be more equal than income
distributions.

19 Currently partners in Poverty Reduction Budget Support to Zambia monitor progress against
agreed benchmarks drawn from the Zambian FNDP. Partners could consider withdrawing aid
when the recipient moves away from commitments to poverty reduction, human rights and
other international obligations, or sound financial management.
20 The per capita 2006 spending on health was US$ 16.7 (K51,500) or 1.5 % of GDP, so the
consumption of (publicly provided) health is very low. The AIDS situation in Zambia is
extremely serious; apart from the human suffering it causes shortages of essential labour.
The missing staff must be replaced, which probably leads to higher wages. This is an area
where the need for increased intervention is obvious, and here for example the Zambian
Government, the Global Fund and PEPFAR provide resources covering ARVs for infected
persons. Since the costs of drugs are covered by the donor this does not seriously crowd out
other government projects, although there are administrative burdens in association with the
administering of the project.

21 The largest social protection scheme in the country is the World Food Programme, which
provides food for US$10-15 million every year reaching 300-400 thousand people/children.

22 This might be too low, since it is calculated from the population growth reported by IMF
(2007b), which is high. Note that IMF and World Bank (2007b) in general have the same
figures for Zambia 2000-2005 for real GDP growth, but IMF on average reports 0.6
percentage points higher population growth rates, and 0.6 percentage points lower GDP per
capita growth rates.

23 The extra high poverty levels this year when taking the underestimation into account are
probably explained to a large extent by drought.
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